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Abstract
We study a matching model with heterogeneous agents, nontransferable utility and
search frictions. Agents differ along a horizontal dimension (e.g. taste) and a ver-
tical dimension (e.g. income). Agents’ preferences coincide only in the vertical
dimension. This approach introduces individual preferences in this literature as
seems suitable in applications like labor markets (e.g. regional preferences). We
analyze how the notion of assortativeness generalizes to integration or segregation
outcomes depending on search frictions. Contrary to results from the purely ver-
tical analysis, here, agents continuously adjust their reservation utility strategies
to changing search frictions. The model is easily generalizable in the utility speci-
fication, the distribution of taste-related payoffs and the number of vertical types.
Extreme utility specifications can be treated as a case of horizontal heterogeneity only.
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1. Introduction
Finding a suitable match on the labor or marriage market is a complex task. Search
frictions in the market force agents to trade off the costs of searching a suitable partner
against the foregone utility due to early match formation. Quality is determined
by a number of traits and agents usually agree on the ranking for a subset of
the characteristics involved - the vertical dimension - and disagree in others - the
horizontal dimension. In this paper, we study the different roles of vertical and
horizontal heterogeneity among agents in matching models. The first parameter
captures a discrete vertical dimension, for example income. All agents agree on the
ranking along this vertical dimension. The second parameter represents a horizontal
non-ordered taste. We refer to this trait as “taste” to highlight that agents do not
necessarily agree on the ranking of agents along this dimension. Agents take the
implications of both dimensions for their individual utility into account when deciding
on their search strategy. The central aim of our paper is to analyze matching and
sorting in this environment assuming that utility is nontransferable.
One recurring result of the pure vertical model is that assortative mating arises
endogenously in equilibrium. In these models all individuals have identical preferences
and prefer to be matched with the highest type. Yet, as the highest types know
that all agents in the market propose to them, they can afford to be selective and
therefore reject agents below some minimum standard (see, for example, Burdett
and Coles 1997).
However, the interaction of horizontal and vertical preferences reveals some new
insights in this strand of search and matching models. First, the model encompasses
the prediction of assortative mating from the pure vertical model. If the level of search
frictions is sufficiently low, the costs of rejecting offers are low and agents, especially
the vertically "gifted", are selective and this leads high type agents to reject low types.
This in turn generates positive assortativeness. Second, contrary to approaches
of purely vertical heterogeneity all agents adjust their optimal reservation utility
strategies in a continuous way. This seems appealing as agents do not fall victim to
drops in their expected lifetime utility at (more or less) arbitrary marginal changes in
decreasing search frictions. Third, we show that low type agents might benefit from
a higher degree of search frictions as they suffer from high types’ withdrawing from
the marriage market concerning low types due to lower costs of searching. Fourth,
our analysis shows that both kind of matching equilibria, complete segregation of
types or integrating equilibria may emerge. Finally, we show that our approach is
general in the sense that it allows for (i) different utility specifications concerning
2
the two traits, (ii) different type distributions along the horizontal dimension as well
as (iii) for the number of vertical types. The analysis shows that extreme utility
specifications (only money or only taste counts) are equivalent to a specification
without vertical heterogeneity at all.
A large empirical literature in economics and sociology documents a positive associa-
tion between traits of partners in existing unions. For example, the classic work by
Becker (1973, 1974) finds a positive correlation between partners’ education levels
and partners’ height. Recent examples in the sociology literature include Kalmijn
and van Tubergen (2006) who find a correlation between ethnicity, while Kalmijn
(2006) and Mare (1991) document assortative mating for religion and education.
However, the theoretical explanations for these correlations at hand are mostly
centered on different preferences regarding (vertically) ordered traits as can be seen
for example in the survey article of Burdett and Coles (1999). The classic example
for such a trait is wage or income. For married individuals, spousal wages are clearly
payoff-relevant. Yet, the documented positive assortative mating might result from
two very distinct underlying preferences. In the first case, all single individuals prefer
to be matched with the highest type, but competition among singles leads to positive
assortative mating. In the second case, agents have “horizontal” preferences and
prefer to be matched with individuals who have a similar income.
By contrast, examples for non-ordered traits are religion, location or “taste” as
mentioned above. For these traits it is only possible to define horizontal preferences.
For example, agents might prefer singles of the same religion. There is also a
recent economic literature which indicates that such traits play a major role in
marriage decisions (e.g. Lundberg and Pollak 2007, Hitsch, Hortacsu and Ariely
2010). However, the search-theoretic literature on matching and sorting has largely
focused on vertical characteristics and therefore provides little guidance to the
equilibrium patterns when horizontal preferences matter. It is this dearth, which
motivates our analysis of individuals’ strategies and the equilibrium outcome in a
dynamic model where agents are characterized by both vertical and horizontal traits.
Our framework builds on the existing literature that deals with dynamic bilateral
search and matching. As mentioned above, the seminal static model by Becker
(1973, 1974) assumes that utility is transferable and that no search frictions are
present. Starting from Becker’s observations, a large literature has emerged which
mainly focuses on vertical heterogeneity. For example Bloch and Ryder (2000),
Shimer and Smith (2000) and Atakan (2006) consider transferable utility and vertical
heterogeneity. Burdett and Coles (1997), Eeckhout (1999) and Smith (2006) analyze
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vertical heterogeneity in a nontransferable-utility model including search frictions,
while Legros and Newman (2007) analyze a setting without search frictions. This
paper extends the latter strand of the literature, while the results do not change
qualitatively as long as part of the intra-marital gain is non-transferable.
Clark (2007) studies bilateral sorting with horizontal heterogeneity in a frictionless
assignment model. We depart from Clark (2007) as in his model agents prefer similar
agents, but the trait considered for matching is ordinal, e.g. height. We borrow the
assumption of a horizontal trait from Konrad and Lommerud (2010), who study the
interplay of matching and redistributive taxation in a static model. In their model,
agents are matched only for a single period in which they have to either accept a
match or stay single forever.
We proceed as follows. In the following section we develop the marriage model. In
the next section we solve for the equilibria in the model for one or two income-levels
and discuss the comparative statics of the approach. Section 4 provides an example
for specific income and taste distance functions. These permit an explicit model
solution. Section 5 discusses three extensions of the model. First, we introduce
weights for the two parts of utility into the model. This allows us to analyze the
full range between two polar cases: in the first polar case agents marry for love and
in the second they marry for money. Second, we introduce a reformulation that
permits one to choose almost any continuous probability distribution for the utility
along the horizontal dimension. Third, we show that our framework can be easily
modified to account for more than two income levels. Finally, we discuss the role of
assortativeness. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2. The Model
There is a unit mass of individuals. Each individual i is characterized by two param-
eters (yi, ti) ∈ Y × T . The first parameter captures vertical ex-ante heterogeneity of
agents. For concreteness, we refer to this trait as income yi. We assume that there
are two income levels such that yi ∈ Y = {yL, yH} with yH ≥ yL ≥ 0. The second
parameter ti captures horizontal heterogeneity and for concreteness we refer to it as
taste ti. We assume a continuum of taste parameters such that ti ∈ T = [0, 2]. In
this taste dimension we follow the common approach from the industrial economics
literature as introduced by Schmalensee (1978) and Salop (1979), i.e. individuals
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are located around a circle of circumference 2.1 This approach allows to avoid end
point effects.2 We assume that individuals are uniformly distributed on Y × T ; both
income levels are equally likely and the location on the circle for each agent is drawn
independently of her income.
Preferences of all agents are identical regarding the relative locations of potential
partners to their own position. In the vertical dimension agents prefer to be matched
with partners of higher income. In the horizontal dimension agents prefer to be
matched with individuals of similar taste.3 If two agents i and j decide to marry
each other, both enjoy a utility gain depending on a measure of the distance between
their respective locations on the circle. Formally the distance in taste x between two
agents i and j is given by
x :=
 min{ti − tj, 2 + tj − ti}, if ti ≥ tjmin{tj − ti, 2 + ti − tj}, if ti < tj .
Defined by this formula the taste difference of two randomly drawn agents x is the
realization of a random variable X. Clearly, as both agents’ taste parameters are
drawn independently and are ex-ante uniformly distributed, the random variable X
is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
If a match is formed, individuals enjoy a utility flow depending on both partners’
incomes and the taste difference x between them for the rest of time.4 The utility
function is modeled in an additively separable manner. One part of an agent’s
utility is the gain induced by household income. A second source of utility is the
intra-marital gain through the difference, or rather the similarity in taste.5 By this
choice the two dimensions of utility generation become substitutes for the agents. If
agent i marries agent j she gets a per-period-utility of
U(yi, ti, yj, tj) = f(yi, yj) + g(x),
1In contrast to Schmalensee (1978) and Salop (1979) we re-scale the circumference of the individual’s
location to 2. Hence, we have a maximum distance of 1 between two individuals on the circle.
2This differs from the approach by Clark (2007) who analyzes a model in which agents prefer
agents of similar height. In such a model agents with “extreme” (small or large) height and
agents with more common realizations behave differently.
3The only paper known to us with a similar framework is Konrad and Lommerud (2010) where a
static approach is conducted.
4For simplification we assume that there is no divorce. This is a crucial assumption as in a
framework including divorce agents would still be on the search after a marriage which they are
not in our model.
5This additively separable utility specification is motivated and justified by the latter result that
there is interaction between these different sources of utility in the optimal search policy although
they are treated separately in the utility function. Clearly, the interaction would be more direct
if the two sources are modeled for example in a multiplicative way.
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where x is determined by the definition given above. Function f , which captures
the part of agent i’s utility induced by the vertical trait income, is assumed to be
increasing in both arguments. Function g, which captures the (intra-marital) utility
gain through the horizontal trait taste, is assumed to be differentiable in (0, 1).
Furthermore, we assume g′ < 0, as agents prefer partners which are located closer to
themselves. We simplify g(1) = 0.6 As long as staying single the per-period-utility
of agent i only depends on her income yi and is given by
U(yi, ti) = f(yi, yi).7
This definition of a single agent’s utility implies that agent i’s utility derived from
income within marriage is only affected if she marries a partner with a different income
level. For ease of notation and reading the utility of a single agent is sometimes
written as f(yi,−) := f(yi, yi). We assume that marital surplus is not transferable.8
The matching institution is characterized by search frictions, i.e. individuals face
difficulties finding a spouse, a job or in general any type of matching partner. As
commonly used in the matching literature with search frictions (e.g. Burdett and
Coles 1997) we use α as the arrival rate of potential partners where α is the parameter
of a Poisson process. The type of a potential partner j an individual i meets is
assumed to be independent of individual i’s type. If two singles meet they first
observe each others traits and then decide either to propose to the other or to
continue searching. If both singles propose to each other a match is formed and
the two singles leave the market forever, otherwise the agents continue searching.
Two individuals forming a match are replaced by (unmarried) clones. Hence, the
distribution of single agents is stationary across time. Future per-period utility flows
are discounted at rate r.9 Both the discount rate and the arrival rate of singles
determine the extent of the market, which we denote by θ := α/r.
A strategy of a (single) individual in this framework is a subset of all potential
6This normalization implies that there are no negative utilities induced by the maximum taste
difference. This assumption does not affect the results qualitatively.
7Note that depending on the matching status of the individual utility U is defined as a function
of 4 arguments when being matched and of only 2 arguments when being single. This will cause
no confusion in the further text.
8The qualitative results do not change if only some part of the surplus is nontransferable. It
seems reasonable to assume that in both labor and marriage market settings some fraction of
the surplus is nontransferable. A possible microfoundation are cooperative bargaining models
with non-cooperative actions as threat-points (e.g. Konrad and Lommerud 2000, Lundberg and
Pollak 1993, 1994); these models result in some degree of nontransferable utility.
9The life-time-utility of an individual marrying someone with per-period-utility k at period 0
when using discount factor r is
∫∞
0 k · e
−rtdt = kr .
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partners for any point in time. Such a subset can be interpreted in the following
way: The subset contains all partners this particular individual would like to marry
and hence she would propose to at a certain point in time.10 Such a strategy of a
particular agent depends on her belief about the distribution of singles who propose
to her. In turn, her strategy determines the offer distribution which other singles
face. In equilibrium, beliefs and offer strategies must be compatible with each
other. For example, consider for a moment two types of agents, females and males.
Females have beliefs about the offers they receive from males and calculate a list of
acceptable males based on these beliefs. This determines the offer distribution of
females proposing to male agents. In equilibrium, females must have correct beliefs
about the offers they receive from males. Likewise, male singles must have correct
beliefs about the offers received by females.
In order to keep the model as tractable as possible, we focus entirely on a stationary
environment. To be more precise, we assume individuals’ strategies are independent
of the time and the ongoing duration of their search. Furthermore, the matching
framework is stationary, as the distribution of singles is stationary over time due to
the cloning assumption. This generates a stationary environment where agents face
the same search problem at any point in time and hence this simplification seems
forgivable.
3. Optimal Search Policies
In the following we first analyze the model without vertical heterogeneity to establish
some intermediate results. This analysis helps to get an intuitive understanding of
the effects due to the horizontal heterogeneity part which is the contribution of this
model to the existing literature. Having done this we move to the more general case
when agents are additionally characterized by two distinct income classes. Finally,
we discuss the comparative statics of the model.
3.1. No vertical heterogeneity
In this section we discuss our model in absence of any vertical heterogeneity aspects
and concentrate on the effects of horizontal heterogeneity only. Therefore, we assume
all agents in the marriage market have the same income yH = yL ≡ y. As introduced
10Note that agents end their game when marrying another agent as there is no divorce and
consequently there are no strategic considerations for married agents.
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above, taste parameter t is distributed uniformly on T = [0, 2] with the geometric
interpretation that individuals are located on a circle with circumference 2.
By the definition of agents’ utility in the case of being matched and being single
we exclude intra-marital income effects when excluding vertical heterogeneity as
f(y,−) = f(y, y). As a consequence, agents effectively incorporate only the taste
parameter of their potential partners into their marriage decisions. Furthermore,
when choosing their optimal strategies agents take the search frictions of the matching
institution into account. They balance the costs of waiting for the next proposal
against the foregone utility due to marrying an ordinary partner.
The optimal strategy of an individual i can be determined by using a dynamic
programming approach. Agents maximize their maximum expected lifetime utility Vi
when being single by choosing optimally the partners they would propose to.11 For
the next short time period ∆ lifetime utility Vi is composed of three things. For the
duration of ∆ the agent stays single and obtains ∆f(y,−). For the second term let αi
denote the arrival rate of singles who are proposing to agent i. Moreover, let H−i(x)
denote the cumulative distribution function that the difference in taste of a proposing
agent is equal to x or less. Then, over this time interval of ∆ she receives at least one
proposal with probability ∆αi. In this case the individual decides whether to accept
the proposal (i.e. proposing) or to reject (i.e. not proposing). As Vi is the maximum
of lifetime utility from the perspective of a single she will only accept proposals
which yield a higher lifetime utility than Vi. Formally, this means that the utility
out of the marriage with an agent at taste distance x, which is (f(y, y) + g(x))/r,
exceeds Vi, i.e. agents apply a reservation utility strategy. The third and last term
of Vi captures the unlucky event that the agent did not meet anyone proposing to


















In equation (1) one has to use the expectation operator for the event of meeting
another proposing agent.12 This is because ex-ante the taste difference x of a randomly
11This approach is widely used in dynamic matching models. For a deeper introduction we refer to
the survey article on search and matching by Burdett and Coles (1999).
12Note that we follow the convention to subscript the expectations operator according to the
respective random variable. Since agent i applies the expectation operator on taste difference
x ∼ H−i(x), it is denoted as E−i.
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met and proposing partner is only determined by the cumulative distribution of
agents proposing to agent i which is F−i(x). The o-function captures the small
probability events of meeting more than one individual in time span ∆. Rearranging
equation (1) and letting ∆→ 0 yields
rVi = f(y,−) +
αi
r
E−i (max {0, f(y, y) + g(x)− rVi}) . (2)
As mentioned above agents apply a reservation utility strategy, a proposal is accepted
if the utility out of marriage exceeds the lifetime utility when staying single. As g(·)
is decreasing in the taste difference x we see from equation (2) that this corresponds
to a cut-off strategy. Each individual i sets a certain minimal quality standard x̄i
on her future partner and accepts proposals if and only if x ≤ x̄i. We will refer to
such strategies as reservation quality strategies. By this observation we restrict the
further analysis to agents’ strategies which are of this type.
Rearranging equation (2) yields the following description of the agents’ strategies:
Lemma 1 Reservation utility strategies
Given the expected distribution of offers by other agents H−i(x), agent i proposes to
all singles with x ≤ x̄i where either
1. rVi = f(y, y) + g(x̄i) and





(g (x)− g (x̄i)) dH−i(x) (3)
or
2. rVi < f(y, y) + g(x̄i), H−i(x̄i) = 1 and
rVi = f(y,−) +
αi
r
E−i (f(y, y) + g(x)− rVi) . (4)
Lemma 1 implicitly characterizes agent i’s optimally chosen subset of acceptable
agents, given her beliefs about the distribution of offers by other singles and about
the search frictions in the market. In the first case agent i is decisive in the sense that
she selects only a subset of all available offers. In the second case she is restricted by
the offers made to her and is willing to accept all of them.
Figure 1 describes the type space and agent i’s strategy.
As there is only one income level all agents are located on one circle. Agent i is
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Figure 1: Geometry of the One-Circle-Model
located to the very left. Given a particular offer distribution H−i(x) she applies a
cut-off-strategy as best response. In the figure the thick line represents agent i’s
cut-off-strategy. The partners she is willing to accept are symmetrically located
around her own position. Which partnerships are possibly formed depends on the
offer distribution. From Lemma 1 it follows that if she is decisive in the marriage
market she is indifferent between marrying and staying single when meeting the
proposing agents j or k. If she is not decisive agent i would like to marry agents
which do not even propose to her and hence accepts all proposals she gets.
Equilibrium
In this section we determine the equilibrium behavior of agents in the two-sided
matching model without vertical heterogeneity. So far, we established that agents will
apply a reservation utility strategy. In the framework without vertical heterogeneity
this coincides with a cut-off-value concerning the maximal distance in taste an agent
accepts when deciding on proposals. The reservation utility Vi, which determines
this cut-off-value x̄i, is determined endogenously by the offer distribution an agent
faces in equilibrium.
We will focus on symmetric equilibria in the sense that in equilibrium an agent never
proposes to another agent who rejects the offer. This restriction is motivated by the
fact that in the model without vertical heterogeneity all agents are ex-ante symmetric
regarding their income and their relative location to others.
As agents apply a reservation utility strategy there are no holes in the subset of
agents an individual proposes to; i.e. an agent proposes to all agents up to a certain
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cut-off-value. Together with the symmetry restriction this shows that the offer
distribution an agent faces in equilibrium does not have holes.13 Otherwise some of
this individual’s proposals would be rejected. Formally, we denote by H−i(x) the
offer distribution agent i faces, where µ−i denotes the fraction of singles who will
propose to agent i on contact. Agent i is now decisive in the sense of the first part
of Lemma 1, which allows us to rewrite equation (2) as






The offer distribution does not have holes and individuals are located uniformly on
the circle. Therefore, the density h−i(x) of offer distribution H−i(x) is h−i(x) = 1/µ−i
and one can rewrite equation (5) as14





Furthermore, the first part of Lemma 1 yields
rVi = f(y, y) + g(x̄i). (7)
Equilibrium requires that equation (6) and equation (7) are satisfied for any agent i.
Per construction of the model, Vi is the maximum value of lifetime utility for each
agent i. Hence, all agents face the same decision problem and will apply the same
cut-off-value x̄ = x̄i and receive the same lifetime utility Vi = V .
The following proposition summarizes the solution.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium without vertical heterogeneity
In equilibrium, all agents marry the first single who yields at least the reservation
13More formally, having no holes in our context means two things: (i) Agents apply a reservation
utility strategy. Therefore, if agent i proposes to an agent j within a certain distance xj then
he proposes to all agents which are located closer to her and hence there are no holes in agent
i’s acceptance region. (ii) If we say that offer distributions do not have holes this means that









utility rV , where rV is characterized by:
(I) rV = f(y, y) + g(x̄)






Proposition 1 shows that there are two unknown parameters (x̄ and V ) for a given
extent of the market θ to characterize the full solution.15
We will mainly focus on the threshold quality x̄ to explain the main features of the
model. This allows a more intuitive discussion of the model especially when we
introduce vertical heterogeneity. The main properties are summarized as follows:
Corollary 1 Properties of the reservation quality






2. The reservation quality x̄ is decreasing in θ and we have
lim
θ→0
x̄ = 1 and lim
θ→∞
x̄ = 0.
There is some intuition behind Corollary 1. As there is no intra-marital redistribution
of income the reservation quality is unaffected by the income level y. Generally, all
agents prefer to be matched with singles of similar taste, as such matches yield the
largest utility gain. An extent θ close to zero implies that there are maximum search
15We can easily rewrite the model to a setup with two sets of agents, say females and males. In
this case let i ∈ {w,m} denote women and men respectively. The reservation utility for females
and males is given by













respectively. In equilibrium the arrival rate of offers µm and the conditional taste distribution
Hm(x) must be consistent with male agents’ reservation strategy defined by equation (9).
Likewise, Hw(x) and µw must be consistent with females’ strategy given by equation (8).
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frictions in the market. In this case all singles set x̄ to the maximum and accept the
first single they encounter. On the other hand, a large extent θ implies that singles
can easily meet each other or that they are very patient. For θ →∞ there are no
search frictions, and every agent will “wait” (for a time span of zero) for her perfect
match. This corresponds to the perfect assortative mating results in previous models
without search frictions, e.g. Becker (1973). However, this “notion of assortative
mating” differs from the usual definition of assortative mating, as the taste parameter
is not an ordinal measure. In our context we observe perfect correlation between
taste characteristics if search frictions disappear. With maximum search fractions
there is no correlation between spouses in taste. For search frictions in between the
correlation is decreasing with increasing search frictions as the reservation quality x̄
is decreasing as Corollary 1 shows.
3.2. Introducing vertical heterogeneity (“Two circles”)
In this section we introduce vertical heterogeneity in our model. Therefore we drop
the assumption of a single income level and consider two income levels yH > yL.
These two income levels are equally likely in the population. As before, the taste
parameter t is distributed uniformly on T = [0, 2] and is drawn independently of an
agent’s income. By this specification we have two different types of agents: High
type agents with high income yH and low type agents with low income yL. Whenever
it is necessary to distinguish between one particular agent and types of agents, we
denote individuals by small letters and types by capital letters.
Contrary to the model without vertical heterogeneity, this time agent i takes into
account intra-marital redistribution of income as f(yi, yH) > f(yi, yL). We will look
for the symmetric equilibrium of the extended model. As before, agents balance
waiting costs and the foregone utility of marrying a mediocre partner. But concerning
the traits of a potential partner both characteristics serve now as substitutes: When
deciding on proposals agents may be willing to accept lower income for a better
match in taste and vice versa.
The derivation of the expression for lifetime utility analogously to equation (1) is
different as there are now two different offer distributions an agent faces: Offers
received from high type agents and offers from low type agents. For high type agents
who are willing to marry her, let HH−i(xH |yi) denote the cumulative probability that
the difference in taste is equal to xH or less. Analogously, we define HL−i(xL|yi) and
xL for low types.16 Let αHi denote the probability that agent i contacts a high type
16To stress that the offer distribution of agent i is fundamentally determined by her income type
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single who is willing to marry her. Likewise, let αLi denote the probability that
she contacts a low type single who is willing to marry her. As in the case without
vertical heterogeneity agent i accepts proposals if utility out of marriage exceeds
her lifetime utility. Hence, agents apply a reservation utility strategy. Expected

















f(yi, yK) + g(xK)
r
}))
+ (1−∆(αHi + αLi ))Vi
]
+ o(∆)
where K ∈ {H,L}.
Rearranging equation (11) and letting ∆→ 0 yields





EK−i (max {0, f(yi, yK) + g(xK)− rVi}) . (12)
So far, we established that agents use a reservation utility strategy. Equation (12)
now implies that for the two types of agents an individual agent will optimally choose
cut-off-values in the taste difference as g is decreasing. For each type of agent there
will be a different cut-off-value as f is increasing in the partner type’s income. In
particular, agent i now calculates two reservation taste levels x̄i(·) depending on the
income type of proposing agents. Generally, as the lifetime utility of staying single
Vi is an outside option independent of the proposal received the cut-off-value for
high type proposals will be higher. I.e. an agent is less selective among high types.
High type agents compensate for greater differences in taste by a higher income.
Similarly to Lemma 1 we can give a general characterization of the reservation utility
strategies as follows:
Lemma 2 Reservation utility strategies for two income levels
Given the expected distribution of offers by other agents HK−i (xK |yi) where K ∈
{H,L}, agent i uses a reservation taste strategy and accepts all agents with x ≤ x̄i(yK)
where either
yi, we write HK−i(·|yi) instead of the (rather correct) HK−i(·) for K ∈ {H,L}.
14
1. rVi = f(yi, yK) + g(x̄i(yK)) and







(g (xK)− g(x̄i (yK))) dHK−i (xK |yi) (13)
or
2. rVi < f(yi, yK) + g(x̄i(yK)), HK−i(x̄i(yK)) = 1 and





EK−i (f(yi, yK) + g(xK)− rVi) . (14)
Equilibrium
After the introduction of the two-sided matching-model with vertical heterogeneity
we now discuss the equilibrium. So far we know, that individuals apply a reservation
utility strategy which coincides with a cut-off-value concerning the taste difference
for every type of agent. The reservation utility for every agent is determined
endogenously.
As in the previous section we again focus on symmetric equilibria. All agents with
the same income are ex-ante identical due to our assumptions on the distributions of
all individual’s traits. But compared to the case without vertical heterogeneity in this
part we have two different types of agents, high types and low types. By imposing
symmetry on the equilibrium outcome we restrict our considerations to cases where
agents of the same type apply the same strategies. By the same reasoning as in the
previous section agents of a particular type end up with the same lifetime utilities.
While the solution for the model without vertical heterogeneity is characterized by
two equations for the two endogenous variables V and x̄, there are now in principle 6
endogenous variables. These are the expected discounted lifetime utility for both high
and low type agents (VH and VL) and the reservation qualities for type K1 proposing
to type K2 which we denote by xK1K2 , where K1, K2 ∈ {H,L}. For example the least
acceptable agent for high types proposing to low types is denoted by xHL. Figure 2
shows the basic geometry for the model with vertical heterogeneity.
There are two income levels yH > yL and hence agents are located on two circles.
Due to the assumptions on the taste distribution they are distributed uniformly on
the two circles (while the fraction of high and low type agents is equal). Exemplified,
agent i is assumed to have high income yH and is located to the very left. For any
given offer distributions from the high types and the low types her best response is a
15
Figure 2: Geometry of the Two-Circles-Model
cut-off-strategy. The figure describes the two reservation qualities xHH and xHL for
one particular high-type agent i. As partners with high income are more attractive
compared to their low income equivalents with identical taste agent i is less selective
among rich types, i.e. we have xHH ≥ xHL.
As a first step, the set of initially six relevant unknown variables can be reduced. A
simple observation shows that in equilibrium high types will have a higher reservation
utility than low types due to their higher utility when being single. Suppose to the
contrary they would have a lower reservation utility than their low type counterparts.
Then, a high type could deviate to the strategy of a low type. As she is even more
attractive than the low type due to her income she would get at least a low type’s
utility out of marriage events (as all agents use reservation utility strategies). In
addition her utility out of staying single is higher. This shows that in equilibrium we
must have VH > VL as yH > yL. As a direct consequence of this high types will set a
higher minimal taste quality for low types than the low types do when facing high
types. Thus, we have xHL ≤ xLH , i.e. for equilibrium considerations xLH does not
play a role as poor types are un-decisive concerning mixed marriages.17
After these preliminary steps we come to the more thorough discussion of the
equilibrium. For the beginning of the analysis let us assume that the extent of
17Consequently, we do not even characterize xLH in the solution which follows. Clearly, the least
acceptable partner for low types among the rich is the one which gives the low type agent
exactly her lifetime utility out of the equilibrium result described in the following.
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the market is very large (θ → ∞). Intuitively, in this case a high type agent
would even reject his poor type taste-equivalent, i.e. an agent with characteristics
(yH , ti) will reject another agent with characteristics (yL, ti) because of intra-marital
redistribution of income. Hence, high type agents generally reject low type agents
and an income segregation equilibrium emerges. Only below a certain threshold θ̃,
high type agents will consider marrying low type agents. For all extents θ above this
threshold the equilibrium solution exhibits xHH > 0 and xHL = 0. We will discuss
the characteristics of θ̃ at the end of the derivation of equilibrium.
We start with the case θ < θ̃, where mixed marriages occur in equilibrium. First,
we look at the equilibrium strategy of a high type agent i. As all agents apply
reservation utility strategies and by the symmetry argument it is clear that the
distribution of outgoing and received proposals do not have holes. Furthermore, as
xHL ≤ xLH we know that a high type agent i is decisive. Let HK−i(xK |yH) denote
the offer distributions of agents of type K ∈ {H,L}, where µK−i denotes the fraction
of singles of type K who are willing to marry agent i on contact. As both high and
low types are equally likely, this implies that agent i faces an arrival rate of 0.5αµH−i
from high types and respectively 0.5αµL−i from low types. By the decisiveness of
agent i we can use the first part of Lemma 2 which yields







(g (xK)− g(x̄i (yK))) dHK−i (xK |yi) .
As the offer distributions do not have holes and individuals are uniformly located on
the two circles the relevant densities are hK−i(xK |yi) = 1/µK−i. Using the type-based
notation this allows to rewrite equation (15) for high types as follows








g(x)dx− g(xHL)xHL − g(xHL)xHL
 .
Using once more agent i’s decisiveness the first part of Lemma 2 yields:
rVH = f(yH , yH) + g(xHH) (17)
rVH = f(yH , yL) + g(xHL) (18)
Altogether, the three equations (16), (17) and (18) give a full characterization of the
first three variables of the model VH , xHH and xHL. Equations (17) and (18) give a
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further intuitive insight as
g(xHL)− g(xHH) = f(yH , yH)− f(yH , yL).
This result shows that under any specification of search frictions a high type agent
“requires” a higher reservation quality from low type agents. More specifically, this
compensation is a constant defined through the utility specification. The difference
between the reservation qualities measured in g equals the income loss due to
redistribution.
Now, we turn to the solution for a low type agent i. Recall that xLH ≥ xHL, as high
types are decisive for mixed marriages. From this we know that low type agents are
only decisive among other poor agents; the decisiveness again holds because of the
symmetry. Regarding Lemma 2 this indicates that one can use the integral part
for the marriage among low types and one has to use the additive term for mixed
marriages.
Hence, for a low type agent i Lemma 2 yields
(19)
rVi = f(yi,−) +
αHi
r







(g (xL)− g(x̄i (yL))) dHL−i (xL|yi) .
By the successive procedure of our equilibrium derivation the reservation quality for
high types concerning low types xHL is already determined. The mass of high types
which proposes to agent i among the high types is 2xHL/2 = xHL due to individuals’
uniform distribution on the circle. Alternatively put, the fraction of high type agents
proposing to low type agents µH−i is equal to xHL. This simplifies the arrival rate of
offers from the high types to αHi = 0.5αxHL. Furthermore, the density of HL−i (xL|yi)
is hL−i = 1/µL−i.
The decisiveness of the poor types among themselves by Lemma 2 yields
rVL = f(yL, yL) + g(xLL). (20)

















We summarize the results for θ < θ̃ in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Integration equilibrium
The solution for the five unknown endogenous variables is characterized by the
following system of equations:
(I) rVH = f(yH , yH) + g(xHH)
(II) rVH = f(yH , yL) + g(xHL)












(IV ) rVL = f(yL, yL) + g(xLL)













Equation (III) of the solution captures the standard reservation equation for high
type agents. It implies that the flow value of search rVH is equal to the current
payoff f(yH ,−) = f(yH , yH) plus the expected surplus generated by the optimal
search strategy. This optimal strategy is given by xHH and xHL. Equations (I)
and (II) show another standard reservation strategy result: High agents must be
indifferent between searching further and marrying the (optimally chosen) least
acceptable partner among high types (in taste distance xHH) and among low types
(in taste distance xHL). In addition the two equations capture the constraints for
this strategy discussed above; that is high type agents require compensation along
the horizontal dimension from low type agents. Equation (V) describes the standard
reservation equation for low type agents. Since low type agents are not decisive for
mixed marriages, they treat xHL essentially as given. Therefore, the first bracket of
the right hand side can be interpreted as the current payoff including a stochastic
19
component generated by possible mixed marriages. The second bracket equals the
expected surplus from choosing the optimal reservation quality within their own types.
Low types have only one decision variable and hence equation (IV) completes the
solution. This equation describes the usual indifference condition and is comparable
to equations (I) and (II).
Worth mentioning is the procedure through which we derived Proposition 2. The
concept of decisiveness we used is generalizable to all (discrete) numbers of agents as
we will show in the section about possible extensions of the model. For the case of
two agents the high types are decisive and decide whom to marry. The poor types
take the high types’ decisions in equilibrium as given and optimize only among their
own type actively.
We now turn to the case θ > θ̃. By the definition of θ̃ no (decisive) high type will
ever accept a proposal of a low type agent. Hence, in this case there are no mixed
marriages and from the perspective of an agent the only considerable offers she
faces are from agents of her own type. Therefore, for these values of θ, the two
types of agents partition themselves into the two classes in equilibrium and we can
immediately apply the results from the case without vertical heterogeneity.
To solve for the symmetric equilibrium we use Proposition 1 for the two types of
agents separately. The only difference to our discussion of the model without vertical
heterogeneity in section 2 is, that the adjusted arrival rate is now 0.5α. This is
because of the random matching assumption and the fact that half of the individuals
are of either type. The result for the segregation equilibrium is shown in the following
Proposition:
Proposition 3 Segregation equilibrium







rVH = f(yH , yH) + g(x̄)
rVL = f(yL, yL) + g(x̄)
As the first equation holds independently of the income type, both types of agents
use the same reservation quality xLL = xHH = x̄. This is due to the fact that agents
do not face intra-marital redistribution of income because of segregation. But clearly,
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the utilities of either type differ according to the different income levels. This can be
seen in Proposition 3 as f(yH , yH) > f(yL, yL).
As a final remark we give a characterization of the critical level of search frictions
θ̃ which separates the integration equilibria from the segregation equilibria. The
threshold extent θ̃ is implicitly characterized by equation (I) and (II) from Proposition
2 which gives
f(yH , yH) + g(xHH) = f(yH , yL) + g(0). (22)
I.e., at θ̃ a high type agent is indifferent between accepting the offer from a high type
with taste distance xHH or accepting the offer of a low type with taste distance 0. As
equation (22) shows, the threshold extent directly translates into a reservation quality
among high types x̃HH . This threshold reservation quality x̃HH can be determined
by equation (III) from Proposition 2 by using xHL = 0. It is easy to show that this
equation and the first equation from Proposition 3 coincide when xHL = 0. Hence,
the threshold extent is well-defined. This completes the solution.
Properties of the general solution
In the following we discuss some properties of the general solution of the model with
vertical heterogeneity and give some intuition for the results developed so far. As the
exogenous parameter in the model relevant for equilibrium behavior is the extent θ
we discuss the properties of the solution regarding changes in θ. We therefore write
particular endogenous variables of the model as functions of the extent θ.18
First, we want to discuss some continuity properties of the general solution:
Proposition 4 Continuity Properties
The reservation qualities xHH(θ), xHL(θ) and xLL(θ) are continuous in θ ∈ R+.
The continuity for θ 6= θ̃ is straightforward as the optimal cut-off strategies are
adjusted smoothly by the agents. When search frictions increase (θ decreases)
starting at θ̃, high type agents start sending offers to low types. High type agents
apply a reservation utility strategy and as the utilities out of marriage are distributed
in a continuous way on the two circles there will be continuity in their reservation
18Note the small difference of the two components of extent θ, which are arrival rate α and discount
factor r. As long as an agent stays single both of them are relevant for the optimal decision.
From the point in time onwards when an agent gets married α becomes irrelevant for her as the
search stops through marriage.
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qualities. For low types these first proposals from high types slightly below θ̃ start
out as probability zero events and hence their reservation utility is not influenced
in a discontinuous manner. Therefore, there is no discontinuity in their proposal
behavior among themselves. For the reservation quality which high types require
from low types we already established that xHL = 0 and hence continuity is obvious.
The continuity property is worth to be stressed from another angle of view. In the
search and matching literature so far the focus is on (continuous) vertical heterogeneity
only. For example the approaches of Burdett and Coles (1997), Eeckhout (1999)
and Smith (2006) share the common feature that agents partition themselves into a
number classes of agents with identical (reservation) utilities. Search frictions mainly
influence the size of these classes. The intuition behind the partitioning result is that
agents can pool with better types which are willing to marry them. I.e. as long as
the best type in a particular class is proposing to another agent the latter agent in
effect has the same reservation utility as the best agent in her class and therefore
applies the same reservation utility strategy as the best agent. From an applied
perspective the result may seem questionable as the reservation utility of each agent
(but the highest) drops sharply if search frictions decrease in a way that the agent
falls out of the class. This discontinuity emerges because at certain levels of search
frictions the agent is not decisive for any marriage he will ever be engaged in. Our
approach results in a continuous adjusting of reservation utility strategies. This is
because the agents are always decisive for some marriages at least among their own
vertical class. In effect, they adjust strategies continuously whenever search frictions
decrease.19
We proceed by analyzing the limiting behavior of the different reservation qualities:
Proposition 5 Limiting Properties
The limiting behavior of the reservation qualities is as follows:
a) limθ→0 xHH(θ) = 1, limθ→0 xLL(θ) = 1 and limθ→0 xHL(θ) is given by g(xHL) =
f(yH , yH)− f(yH , yL).
b) limθ→∞ xHH(θ) = 0, limθ→∞ xLL(θ) = 0
The first part of Proposition 5 covers the case of maximum search frictions. Due
to our normalization of function g(x) ≥ 0 for all possible taste differences x agents
always (weakly) prefer marrying within their own class rather than staying single.
19This feature of our model is not driven by reducing the number of (vertical) types to two. We
will come back to this point when we speak about the generalization to the N -type case.
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As a high type faces re-distributional losses when marrying a low type, she is only
willing to marry low type agents who compensate her for this loss. This holds as
well for maximum search frictions and explains the limiting behavior of xHL(θ).
The second part of Proposition 5 is straightforward. In a market without search
frictions complete segregation emerges. Every agent sets her reservation quality to
the maximum as she meets all agents instantaneously.
Proposition 6 Differentiability Properties
a) Reservation quality xLL(θ) is differentiable for all θ ∈ R+ \ θ̃ and is not
differentiable in θ̃.
b) Reservation quality xHH(θ) is differentiable for all θ ∈ R+ and is decreasing in
θ.
c) Reservation quality xHL(θ) is differentiable for all θ ∈ R+ \ θ̃ and is non-
increasing in θ.
Once again, the differentiability properties outside θ̃ are straightforward. Agents
smoothly adjust their reservation utility strategies in response to a small change in
search frictions. In contrast, around θ̃ only xHH is differentiable.
When search frictions increase (θ decreases) beyond θ̃, high types start to propose
to low type agents. Contrary to low types, high types are decisive. As marriages
with low types start out as a probability zero event, high types do not need to adjust
the change rate of their proposals to other high types when search frictions increase.
Hence, the solution for xHH exhibits differentiability in θ̃.
In general, reservation qualities xHL and xLL are not differentiable in θ̃. For an extent
slightly below θ̃, low types receive offers from high types with a positive probability.
Low type agents receive a larger utility gain from these offers than from the least
acceptable partner within their own class. Since the low types are not decisive for
these mixed marriages, one can interpret the possibility of marrying a high type as a
new opportunity which happens by chance. Since low types correct their reservation
quality for these lucky events, their reservation quality is not differentiable in θ̃. An
example which illustrates this is discussed in section 4. We then show that the low
types may even profit from higher search frictions because of these lucky events.
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3.3. Comparative Statics
In section 2 we defined an agent’s utility as the sum of two sources: (i) Utility
out of an household’s income and (ii) utility out of the taste characteristics of the
two spouses (if married). By defining a range for income-related payoff f and for
taste-related payoff g one can weigh the two sources of utility; e.g. if income-related
utility is relatively high compared to the possible gain through taste, agents will be
more concerned about the income of their partner than on her taste characteristic.
To allow for some comparative statics in these different specifications of our model
we now assign weights to the two parts of utility. Subsequently, we discuss the
quantitative changes associated with variations in these weights.
In particular, let β ∈ (0, 1) denote the weight for the payoff related income and let
1− β be the weight on taste-related utility. Agent i’s utility if married to agent j is
then defined as
U(yi, ti, yj, tj) = βf(yi, yj) + (1− β)g(x),
where x is the taste difference as before.20 The limiting cases β → 0 and β → 1
describe agents who are “romantically minded” or “greedy for money” respectively.21
First, we want to highlight that these weights do not change the general analysis at
all. As our concept of utility is ordinal, we can simply transform the utility function
by dividing with weight β. This transformed utility function is




As g̃ is decreasing and g̃(1) = 0 the transformed utility Ũ meets all requirements on
the utility specification imposed in section 2. Hence, the analysis does not change
and replacing g by g̃ in Proposition 1 yields the solution for the case without vertical
heterogeneity. Likewise, Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 implicitly characterize the
solution for the integration and segregation equilibria respectively.
In the following, we discuss the comparative statics for the reservation qualities
associated with the limiting cases β → 0 and β → 1. By equations (I) and (II) of
Proposition 2 the critical market extent θ̃ which divides the integration equilibrium
20The only thing which therefore remains normalized as before is g(1) = 0. Again, this just
simplifies in a sense, that from a taste-perspective everyone could be acceptable to anyone else.
21We stick to the assumption that all agents have the same utility function. Weakening this requires
the model more fundamentally.
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and the segregation equilibrium (where xHL = 0) is implicitly defined by
β(f(yH , yH)− f(yH , yL)) = (1− β)(g(0)− g(xHH)). (23)
This can also be seen directly in equation (22) when using the modified utility
specification. As before, this equation yields an expression for xHH at the critical
market extent θ̃. It is obvious from equation (23) that an increase of β requires a
higher threshold xHH at θ̃ as g is decreasing in x. What are the implications for
θ̃? From the previous analysis we know that the high types’ reservation qualities
are increasing in θ, i.e. the lower the search frictions (increasing θ) the lower the
taste difference for the least acceptable partners (e.g. x̄ is decreasing). Hence, this
shows that higher values of β are associated with smaller values of the critical market
extent θ̃.
Using this result, it is straightforward to show that the integration equilibrium does
not exist for values of β beyond an upper bound β̃. Note that the right-hand-side of
equation (23) captures the maximum possible gain along the horizontal dimension
relative to the least acceptable high type partner. It is bounded by (1− β)g(0) as
g(1) = 0. Recall that the left-hand-side of this equation describes the income loss for
the high type agent due to intra-marital redistribution when marrying a low type.
Imposing the constraint that high type agents never consider marrying low types
requires that the redistributional loss is larger than the maximum gain along the
taste dimension. Hence, we have to solve the respective inequality
β(f(yH , yH)− f(yH , yL)) > (1− β)g(0)
for β. It follows that for
β > β̃ := g(0)
f(yH , yH)− f(yH , yL) + g(0)
complete segregation emerges for all values of θ. Clearly, we have 0 < β̃ < 1. As
before, both low and high type agents apply the same cut-off-value concerning the
taste difference within their own class in this equilibrium. It is fully characterized by
Proposition 3 (by using g̃) and xHL = 0.
Intuitively, if β > β̃ a high type agent is potentially proposing to every other high type
agent and still prefers the worst high type agent to the most preferred low type agent.
As marrying the least acceptable high type for her is equivalent to staying single (due
to g(1) = 0 and f(yH ,−) = f(yH , yH)) we have complete segregation. Therefore, for
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high weights on the income function f the model with vertical heterogeneity can be
viewed as individuals living in two separate worlds or castes. With this interpretation
the arrival rate of potential mates with identical income is α/2.
Obviously, decreasing β is associated with larger values of θ̃. In the limiting case,
income becomes irrelevant for the agents’ decision problem as in the case without
vertical heterogeneity. Hence, the functions xHH , xHL and xLL converge pointwisely to
the same function which is the one-circle solution for an arrival rate of α. Individuals
live in a world where nobody cares about vertical heterogeneity in the limit.
In sum, we have established two results. First, from a purely technical point of
view assigning weights to the two parts of the utility function does not change the
analysis. More interestingly, in both limiting cases the equilibrium can be derived
from the solutions for the model without vertical heterogeneity. However, the critical
threshold θ̃ differs across the two limiting cases.
The reasoning for the two limiting cases is also quite different. Intuitively, for large
values of β only high types are acceptable for a high type. Hence, low types are stuck
with each other and this leads to complete segregation. Since the markets of low
and high type agents are divided into two separate parts, the arrival rate of offers
is equal to 0.5α. Hence, the reservation qualities for this case can be obtained by
inserting this modified arrival rate into the one-circle-solution. By contrast, for low
values of β income is not very important and in the limiting case (β → 0) income
does not affect agents’ decisions. In this case both low and high type agents are
basically identical. Hence, the result converges to the one-circle solution with the
original arrival rate α.
4. An Example
In the previous section we characterized the general solution of the two-sided match-
ing problem with vertical and horizontal heterogeneity. We illustrate the results
in this section by the means of an example. In order for doing so, we have to
choose a specification for the redistribution of intra-marital household income f(·, ·).
Furthermore, we specify the intra-marital utility by taste g(·) which is defined as a
function of the distances in taste for married couples.
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We assume that singles and spouses receive the average household income:
f(yH , yH) = f(yH ,−) = yH
f(yH , yL) = f(yL, yH) =
yH + yL
2
f(yL, yL) = f(yL,−) = yL
By this symmetric choice, both partners within a marriage receive the same utility,
although partners may have been differently endowed ex-ante. Let intra-marital
utility through taste be linearly related to the distance:
g(x) = 1− x.
Clearly, this specification fulfills all the assumptions from the previous section.
Inserting these functions into Propositions 2 and 3 yields the explicit solution as
follows:
Corollary 2 Explicit solution for the example
a) For θ ≤ θ̃ an integration equilibrium emerges, where the five unknown endoge-
nous variables VH , VL, xHH , xHL and xLL are characterized by the following
system of equations:
(Ia) rVH = yH + 1− xHH
(IIa) rVH =
yH + yL
2 + 1− xHL






(IV a) rVL = yL + 1− xLL












b) For θ > θ̃ a segregation equilibrium emerges, where the three unknown en-
dogenous variables VH , VL and x̄ are characterized by the following system of
equations:




1 + θ − 1)
(IIb) rVH = yH + 1− x̄
(IIIb) rVL = yL + 1− x̄
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c) The threshold extent θ̃ is given by
θ̃ = 82− (yH − yL)(yH − yL)2
. (24)
Figure 3 shows the solution for the reservation qualities xHH(θ), xHL(θ) and xLL(θ)
for the specification given above. As parameters we use yH = 1 and yL = 0.25.
Agents discount future utility with r = 0.05.22 By equation (24) the threshold extent
θ̃ is equal to 1609 .
For a market extent above θ̃ the solution exhibits complete segregation. In this case
there are no mixed couples and xHL(θ) = 0. The two reservation qualities for high
types within themselves and for low types within themselves coincide as established
by Proposition 3. Again, as there are no mixed couples intra-marital redistribution
does not play a role. Therefore, agents condition their proposals among their own
type only on taste and x̄ is identical for both types. In the limit (θ →∞) the two
reservation qualities xHH(θ) and xLL(θ) converge to zero. This is because an infinite
market extent implies that all agents meet each other instantaneously.
For θ ≤ θ̃ integration equilibria emerge. For values around θ̃, the three reservation
qualities clearly exhibit the continuity and differentiability properties discussed in the
previous section. Equations (IIa) and (IIIa) of Corollary 2 imply xHH−xHL = yH−yL2
which equals 38 in our specific example. This distance is the “compensation” in
taste required by high type agents from low type agents for the income loss due
to redistribution. Our assumption for g(·) implies that this distance in reservation
quality is constant in the example. Hence, in the figure xHL(θ) and xHH(θ) are
parallel functions for θ ≤ θ̃. For maximum search frictions (θ close to zero) the
reservation qualities xHH and xLL converge to one. In this case all agents propose
to all agents within their own class. This is due to the normalization g(1) = 0
which assures that marriages among identical income types are always preferred to
staying single forever. As discussed, high type agents do not accept all low type
agents, but only those who yield at least the value of staying single. The value for
xHL(0) can be calculated by using part a) of Proposition 5. In our specific example
xHL(0) = 1− yH−yL2 =
5
8 .
A notable feature is that for a certain range of θ the reservation quality within low
type agents is decreasing in θ. That is, although the probability of meeting other low
22We set incomes and the discount rate r to specific values to simplify the example as much as
possible. This implies that the figure shows the reservation qualities for different values of α.
Since the qualitative findings are independent of specific values of r, we denote all functions as
functions depending on θ.
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Figure 3: Reservation qualities
type agents increases, low agents are less selective within their own class. Intuitively,
the decisive high type agents reduce the set of acceptable low type partners if the
market extent increases. As a consequence low type agents realize that the lucky
event of being matched to a high type becomes more unlikely. Hence, in this range
they get less picky regarding low types although market conditions improve. Figure
4 highlights the consequences of this feature on agents’ lifetime utilities.
For the aforementioned range of θ < θ̃ low type agents would be better off if the
extent of the market shrinks slightly. This is driven by the positive probability
of being matched with a high type. Low type agents prefer these mixed matches,
because they marry a partner with similar taste and a high income. By contrast, high
type agents dislike the income reduction through redistribution and would always
prefer lower search frictions.
This result from the example is in harsh contrast to the previous literature on search
and matching markets in models with vertical heterogeneity only like Burdett and
Coles (1997). There, the agents partition themselves into classes. Within each
class all agents have the same lifetime-utility. An agent only suffers from decreased
search frictions if she drops out due to a marginal change in the search frictions at
discrete values of the frictions. This is a purely mathematical result. In our model
agents somehow adjust their strategies when search frictions lead to reduced offering
behavior from higher types. By the horizontal heterogeneity among types high
types continuously reduce their offers to lower types when search frictions decrease.
Depending on the mass of high type agents this already leads to a reduction in the
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Figure 4: Lifetime utilities
expected lifetime-utilities of lower type agents. Incorporating this they suffer from
lower search frictions and adjust their behavior in a continuous manner. Differently
put, decreasing search frictions has two effects: (i) The direct effect leads to meeting
potential partners more often. (ii) The indirect effect leads to agents possibly being
more selective when deciding on whom to propose to. The example shows that
the second, indirect effect may outweigh the first, direct effect of decreasing search
frictions.23
5. Extensions
In this section we want to show possible extensions of the framework we discussed
above.
The first extension concerns the restriction to two types of agents only. We show
that the method for solving the model works for any discrete number for the types
of agents.
In the second part we see that it is dispensable that the taste related payoff is related
to the distance in location. One can skip w.l.o.g. the intuitive, but very specific
interpretation of the agents being located on a circle. This does not change the
general results.
In a third section we conclude with a discussion of the assortativeness of the results
from the general model from section 3. In general, there is a higher degree of positive
23Clearly, only agents which are not decisive concerning potentially formed marriages may suffer
from decreased search frictions.
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assortativeness concerning the vertical income attribute of the individuals when
search frictions become lower. But, for intermediate ranges of market extent θ there
is a range where this only partially holds true.
5.1. More than two types of income
In the previous sections we have analyzed the case of at most two discrete levels of
income and horizontal heterogeneity. A central assumption regarding the horizontal
dimension is symmetry in payoffs, that is both spouses receive exactly the same
noneconomic gain when married (cf. Konrad and Lommerud 2010). This symmetry
allows us to partially apply results known from the model involving only a vertical
dimension (e.g. Burdett and Coles 1997). In particular, this symmetry implies that
the high type agent is decisive for mixed marriages. Hence, in equilibrium all low-type
agents who receive offers from a particular high type agent also propose to this
agent. This observation is crucial to our model as it allows to analyze equilibrium
stepwise. Starting from the decisive high type the low types take the high type’s
equilibrium behavior essentially as given and perform a conditional maximization.
In the following, we will exploit this idea to establish an integration equilibrium
for N discrete income levels y1 < y2 < ... < yN . In generalization to the model
discussed so far, now each type except the lowest type will be decisive concerning
agents with lower vertical traits. Again, we denote individuals by small letters and
income classes with capital letters if a distinction seems helpful. For the following
let J = {1, 2, ..., N}.
Let αJi denote the probability that agent i contacts a single of type J who is willing
to marry her. Generally, we denote the cumulative probability that the distance of
an agent of type J who is willing to marry individual i as HJ−i(xJ |yi). In comparison
to the cases discussed so far there are now in general N different types of agents































For given offer distributions, we could now reformulate Lemma 2 to describe the
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case of N different income levels. However, as the reasoning is identical we proceed
directly to equilibrium behavior.
For each type of agent J there is one reservation utility level VJ . Furthermore, each
type of agent J has N different reservation qualities concerning partners from every
potential type of agent. Hence, there are N + 1 unknowns for each type of agent
which sum up to N · (N + 1) unknowns to describe individuals’ equilibrium strategies
completely.
As before matches are formed only by mutual agreements. Exactly as with the
case of only two income levels, higher types have higher reservation utilities. Hence
they are the decisive players when agents of different income levels propose to each
other. It follows that the amount of unknowns relevant for equilibrium behavior
can be reduced to those relevant for the formation of matches. As Type N agents
are the highest type in the market, they are always decisive. Therefore, there are
N binding reservation quality equations associated with type N agents. We call
these “decisiveness equations” in the following. An agent of type N − 1 is decisive
concerning all lower types and her own type which yields N − 1 relevant decisiveness
equations. In general, an agent of type J applies J relevant strategies for equilibrium
behavior. In addition there are N unknowns concerning the reservation utilities.




J = N + N · (N + 1)2
unknowns.
Since equilibrium requires that agents have correct beliefs about the offers they
receive, there is a unique reservation utility for each agent of type J . The expression
for this reservation utility is a straightforward generalization of Lemma 2. This step
provides N equations in total. Furthermore, each type combination between two
individuals of types K and respectively L where K ≥ L yields an additional equation
of the form
rVK − f(yK , yL) = g(xK(yL)).
There are N equations concerning the reservation utilities. For each K ≥ L there




J = N + N · (N + 1)2
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equations in total which equals the number of unknowns. Hence, this system of
equations characterizes the equilibrium solution. Once again, without specifying the
distance and payoff functions, no explicit derivations can be offered.
Depending on the difference between the income levels of the different types of agents
the solution exhibits segregation as well as integration equilibrium features between
different types. As in the previous sections let xKL denote the least acceptable L-
type-agent from the perspective of K-type-agents. Hence, whenever a K-type-agent
meets an L-type agent of quality xKL, she is indifferent between staying single or
marrying this agent. The following Proposition summarizes the system of equations
for high search frictions in the sense that even the highest (N) type is willing to
marry some agents of the lowest type24:
Proposition 7 Complete integration equilibrium
The solution for the N + N ·(N+1)2 unknown endogenous variables is characterized by
a system of two types of equations.
Decisiveness equations:
rVK = f(yK , yL) + g(xKL) for all K ≥ L
Reservation utility equations:



















In general, depending on the extent of the market, there emerge all intermediate
equilibria between the perfect integration equilibria discussed in Proposition 7 and the
perfect segregation equilibria. We do not provide solutions for all these intermediate
cases. The method to construct these cases is clear from the discussion above, while
writing down all possible cases is lengthy and involves bulky notation.
We conclude this section with the remark that the continuity and differentiability
properties are passed on to the reservation utilities in the same manner as in section
3.2. All the reservation qualities are continuous in the market extent everywhere.
Furthermore the reservation qualities are not differentiable for market extents where
24Clearly, by the fact that reservation utility is increasing with type and all agents apply reservation
utility strategies this implies that every two types of agents are possibly matched in equilibrium.
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a type receives the first proposal from an upper class. This missing differentiability
for a certain type is inherited to all lower classes as agents of this particular class
adjust their behavior concerning all types they make proposals to so far. Both of
these properties hold also true for the reservation utilities of all types.25
5.2. Different distribution for taste-related payoff
A second possible avenue for altering the payoff structure is to change directly the
payoffs. So far, we interpret the utility gain along the horizontal dimension as a
result from two steps. First, individuals are randomly and uniformly located on a
circle. Second, agents are randomly matched to each other. In general, there are
many ways to define utility via the two locations of the spouses; e.g. in a marriage
market model with men and women the utility induced by taste could be determined
solely through the location of the woman. The central idea of our model is that
agents prefer to be matched with agents who are horizontally close to themselves.
Therefore, an obvious choice for linking location and the resulting taste-related payoff
is the distance x between the two locations. In the model we consider a very general
measure of distance, namely g(x).
Since agents are randomly matched to each other and the taste (location) parameter
t is uniformly distributed on [0, 2], the distance X of two randomly matched agents
is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. However, the solution method and the general form
of g allow for a wide range of random variables capturing the taste-related payoff in
the horizontal dimension as the following Proposition shows:
Proposition 8 Possible distributions for match-specific values
Let X ∼ U [0, 1]. Let HZ(z) denote the cumulative distribution function of a random
variable Z where Z has finite support [a, b] ⊂ R. Choosing a utility specification
g(x) := b−H−1Z (x) for the taste-related utility gain is equivalent to solving the model
with Z ∼ HZ(z) and g(z) = b− z.
Proposition 8 shows that the assumption of the uniform distribution for the taste-
related payoff (distance) is not restrictive. The payoff can follow any continuous
25In contrast to the continuity result concerning the reservation utility strategies the missing
differentiability is a consequence from the discreteness of the number of vertical types. The
differentiability is affected by the strictly positive mass of agents assigned to a certain vertical
type. If all types would be atomless in a continuous distribution of types this feature is unclear
so far. However, our approach uses the discrete number of types and the continuous case is
postponed to further research.
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probability distribution which has finite support. Hence, there are virtually no
restrictions concerning the distribution of match-specific values. As before, the
distance b− z is just a normalization which implies that agents are never matched
to individuals who would yield a negative payoff along the taste dimension. As in
the untransformed model we could easily allow negative payoffs.
5.3. The assortativeness of the model with both types of heterogeneity
The notion of assortativeness used in the literature on search and matching with
heterogenous agents is well-known. For an introduction of the concept we refer
to Burdett and Coles (1999). In addition to the theoretical literature there is a
lot of empirical work on the assortativeness of spouses concerning particular traits.
Becker (1973, 1974) finds a positive correlation between partners’ education levels
and partners’ height. Recent examples in the sociology literature include Kalmijn
and van Tubergen (2006) who find a correlation between ethnicity, while Kalmijn
(2006) and Mare (1991) document assortative mating for religion and education.
Much less empirical literature exists on the similarity of horizontal traits such as e.g.
religion or location. However, this literature indicates that such traits play a major
role in marriage decisions (e.g. Lundberg and Pollak 2007, Hitsch et al. 2010).
Alas, there is no unique answer how to generalize the term of assortativeness from
a model of vertical heterogeneity only to our model of vertical and horizontal
heterogeneity. What seems clear is, that by construction the two kinds of traits in
our model serve as substitutes for each other: If an agent is willing to propose to
a low type agent she has to be compensated for this by a higher similarity in the
horizontal component. Similarly, to form a match with a partner of the high type an
agent is willing to incur compromises concerning the emotional quality of the match
reflected by a potentially relatively bad match in the horizontal trait.
A first possibility to define assortativeness is as similarity in traits between matched
agents. This is in line with the common meaning of the term assortativeness. Refer-
ring to such a definition clearly decreasing search frictions increase the assortativeness
among formed matches. Better matching institutions lead to high types reducing their
reservation quality among high and low types. In effect, for high types an assortative-
ness result holds in the following sense: If search frictions decrease (i) the reservation
quality for every potential partner decreases and (ii) the probability of agreeing to
match with a partner of a lower type relatively decreases. The second statement of
this interpretation follows as the difference f(yH , yH)− f(yH , yL) = g(xHH)− g(0)
is a constant and hence, the relative probability xHH/(xHH + xHL) of marrying a
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high type in the case of forming a match generally increases with decreasing search
frictions.
Similarly, the low type agents adjust their behavior when facing decreasing search
frictions. Two things seem worth mentioning in this context. When search frictions
are maximal any match which assures the parties a utility of at least their single
utility is formed. When search frictions decrease, low type agents become far more
selective among their own type then among the rich type. I.e. for low values of the
extent θ the reservation quality increases faster among their own type. Hence, for a
certain range of values the assortativeness in the vertical trait decreases, whereas the
assortativeness in the horizontal dimension increases. This feature reverses in the
range of extents close to the extent where the complete segregation equilibria emerge.
However, this notion does not allow for a natural definition of "positive" or "negative"
assortativeness as there is per se no room for this in the horizontal dimension.
Contrary to this first notion of assortativeness one could identify this term with the
similarity of formed matches within one pair of matched agents concerning one of
the two traits. Naturally, one could restrict attention to the positive or negative
assortativeness along the vertical dimension. For this interpretation our model offers
perfect correlation whenever the extent is above θ̃. For extents below this value
the positive assortativeness is negatively related with the search frictions for the
(decisive) high types. For low types there may be a range (whenever xLL/(xHL+xLL)
is decreasing in θ) where the correlation in the vertical trait in matches with low
types reduces with decreasing search frictions.
6. Conclusion
This article analyzes how matching and sorting takes place when individuals are
characterized by both ex-ante heterogeneity and horizontal preferences. Our dynamic
model assumes that search frictions are present in the market and that utility is
nontransferable. Along the vertical dimension all individuals agree on the ranking
of agents and prefer to be matched with the highest agent. This vertical trait can
therefore be interpreted as income, wealth or even beauty. Unlike in most of the
search-theoretic literature, the horizontal dimension considered here is not ordered.
It captures inputs which are not equally ranked across agents. Possible examples
are regional preferences concerning a job or sharing hobbies with the spouse. The
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analysis for our definition of horizontal heterogeneity26 is quite different from the
more common assumption of preferring similar characteristics along an ordered trait
like height (e.g. Clark 2007). 27 It is also possible to define positive or negative
assortative mating.
One appealing result is that the strategy of the highest agent is continuous in the
market extent. By contrast, in the typical vertical model (e.g. Burdett and Coles
1997) high type agents change their offers to lower types discontinuously. Our result
is driven by the fact that agents are able to condition their offers on both dimensions.
If the search frictions are below some threshold, high-type agents start sending offers
to low-type agents. When the extent of the market is exactly at this threshold,
high-type agents propose only to the low-type agent who yields the largest horizontal
payoff. When search frictions increase further, high-type agents expand the set of
acceptable low-type agents.
Driven by this continuity property, we can identify ranges of search frictions where
the direct (positive) effect of decreasing search frictions is outweighed by the indirect
(negative) effect for every type of agent (except the highest). In most cases, agents
reduce their set of acceptable partners within their own class when search frictions
decrease and hence are better off. However, for low-type agents this relation reverses
for certain ranges of search frictions. For these particular ranges the probability
for mixed matches is elevated when search frictions increase. Since utility is non-
transferable, low type agents benefit more than high types from the mixed matches.
Whether this effect leads to an increase of aggregate welfare depends on the welfare
criterion. However, space constraints do not permit a thorough welfare analysis.
Finally, the approach to tackle the issue of horizontal heterogeneity in the presented
way seems appropriate for a handful of reasons. The model is generalizable in many
kind of ways. The weights assigned to the utilities from the two traits are not a
restriction as long as utility remains additively separable. The match-specific utility
derived from the horizontal trait can be distributed quite generally. The number
of types in the vertical dimension can be increased to an arbitrary natural number.
The prediction of the model depends solely on the level of search frictions and allows
for equilibria with mixed marriages as well as for complete segregation in an intuitive
way.
26Our definition follows Konrad and Lommerud (2010) who analyze the implications of redistributive
taxation in a static one-period model.
27In these models the probability of being matched is usually not independent of the location. For
example, if agents prefer partners of similar height, individuals in the middle of the distribution
have higher chances of meeting an appropriate partner.
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There are several routes for future research. For simplicity, it is assumed that
individuals who leave the market are immediately replaced by clones. Introducing
different inflow and outflow specifications should lead to multiple equilibria for a
given extent of the market. Another important assumption is the symmetry of the
horizontal dimension. This ensures that both agents in a match always receive the
same gain along the horizontal dimension. This in turn implies that high-type agents




Proof of Lemma 1
From equation (2) we know that an agent accepts all proposals which yield her a
higher utility than staying single, i.e. agent i accepts if and only if
rVi ≤ f(y, y) + g(x). (26)
In general, there are two cases to distinguish: In the first case agent i does not
accept all proposals which she faces. Thereby, she accepts all proposals up to the
taste difference where she is indifferent between marriage and staying single. This
determines her reservation quality x̄i which is then given by
rVi = f(y, y) + g(x̄i). (27)
Using equation (27) we can reformulate equation (2). This yields





(g (x)− g (x̄i)) dH−i(x).
In the second case the agent accepts every proposal she faces. The agent would be
even willing to accept agents whose location is beyond the taste difference of x̄i, but
these individuals do not propose to her. Formally, we have
rVi < f(y, y) + g(x̄i) and H−i(x̄i) = 1
as every offer is accepted. Furthermore, as the agent always marries when she faces
a proposal the maximum operator from equation (2) simplifies and one gets
rVi = f(y,−) +
αi
r
E−i (f(y, y) + g(x)− rVi) .
Proof of Proposition 1
The derivations of the equations are shown in the text. For the equilibrium property
of this characterization we still have to show that the strategies of the agents generate
a consistent offer distribution for a particular agent. As every agent decides to propose
to all other agents within taste distance x̄ by the symmetry of agent’s distance to
each other all proposals are accepted. If agents calculate this best response on the
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belief on the offer distributions that all other agents play the strategy described in
the Proposition, then choices and expectations are consistent with each other.
Proof of Corollary 1
The first part simply follows by equations (I) and (II) from Proposition 1 and recalling
the utility definition f(y,−) = f(y, y).
For the second part let
























g′(x)(1 + θx̄) < 0.
The last sign holds as the numerator is positive due to g′ < 0 and the denominator is
negative for the same reason. Hence, we get dx̄/dθ < 0, i.e. the reservation quality
required by the agents is increasing in the extent of the market.
It remains to show the limiting behavior of x̄. Letting θ → 0 and finding a solution to
equation (10) is equivalent to solving g(x̄) = 0 which yields x̄ = 1. The considerations






For given θ we can choose x̄ arbitrarily close to 0 such that the right-hand-side is
arbitrarily close to zero, whereas the left-hand-side still yields a finite value. Hence,
this equation has always a solution. Furthermore, as the right-hand-side is increasing
in θ, we have that limθ→∞ x̄(θ) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
This is a direct generalization of the proof from Lemma 1. The rest follows directly
from the text.
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Proof of Proposition 2
The proof follows directly from the text.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof follows directly from the text and from Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 4
First note that xHL(θ̃) = 0, which we will use at some points throughout the proof.
First, we consider the continuity of xHH(θ). The continuity for θ ∈ R+ \ {θ̃} can be
seen directly from the equation system (I)-(V) of the integration equilibrium given
in Proposition 2 and the expression g(x̄) from the income segregation equilibrium
given in Proposition 3. For the case of θ = θ̃ equating (I) and (III) together with








Hence, this solution for xHH at θ̃ coincides with the solution of g(x̄) of the segregation
equilibrium. Since the solution is the same on both sides of θ̃ we have continuity for
xHH for all θ ∈ R+.
Now we analyze xLL(θ). The continuity for θ ∈ R+ \ {θ̃} can be seen directly from
the equation system (I)-(V) of the integration equilibrium given in Proposition 2 and
the expression g(x̄) from the income segregation equilibrium given in Proposition 3.








Hence, this solution for xHL at θ̃ coincides with the solution of g(x̄) of the segregation
equilibrium. Since the solution is the same on both sides of θ̃ we have continuity for
xLL for all θ ∈ R+.
Finally, we analyze xHL(θ). The continuity of xHL for all θ ∈ (0, θ̃) follows directly
from the equation system (I)-(V). For θ > θ̃ we have xHL ≡ 0. Hence, as xHL is zero
per definition at θ̃ we have continuity for all θ ∈ R+.
Proof of Proposition 5
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a) Let θ = 0. By equations (I) and (III) from Proposition 2 we get g(xHH) = 0. By
the definition of g this yields limθ→0 xHH(θ) = 1. The same argument for equations
(IV) and (V) from Proposition 2 shows limθ→0 xLL(θ) = 1. Furthermore, by equating
(I) and (II) from Proposition 2 one gets that the difference between least acceptable
partners (measured in g) is a constant:
g(xHL)− g(xHH) = f(yH , yH)− f(yH , yL) (28)
We already know for θ → 0 we have g(xHH) = 0. Using this in equation (28) shows
the last claim from part (a).
b) For θ → ∞ we have complete segregation and hence Corollary 1 applies. This
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6
By Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 the differentiability of reservation qualities
xLL, xHH and xHL for all θ ∈ R+ \ θ̃ is obvious. The only thing which remains to be
shown is the differentiability of xHH in θ̃.
For reasons of simplicity we analyze the system of equations given in Proposition
2 and Proposition 3 as functions of the market extent α instead of θ; the latter
definition of market extent is just a transformation by the constant discount factor r.
By the implicit functions theorem the left- and the right-hand-side derivatives of the















Hence, xHH is differentiable in R+. Furthermore, the analysis of the derivatives shows
easily, that the reservation qualities xHH and xHL are decreasing resp. non-increasing
everywhere.
Proof of Corollary 2
All stated equations are the results of calculations using the formula given in Propo-
sition 2 for part a) and Proposition 3 for part b).
It only remains to calculate threshold extent θ̃. From equation (22) it is clear that
at θ̃ we have
yH + 1− xHH =
yH + yL




By Proposition 4 we know that xHH(θ) is continuous at θ̃ and hence, using equation







1 + θ̃ − 1).
Solving this for θ̃ yields
θ̃ = 82− (yH − yL)(yH − yL)2
.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8
So far, distance X is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Therefore, we have F (x) =
P (X ≤ x) = x. Let Z be another random variable with finite support [a, b] ⊂ R with
HZ(z) = P (Z ≤ z) denoting the corresponding cumulative distribution function and
associated quantile function H−1Z (q). Let Y denote the random variable obtained
from transforming X according to Y := H−1Z (X).
For the distribution of Y we then have:
P (Y ≤ y) = P (H−1Z (X) ≤ y) = P (HZ(H−1Z (X)) ≤ HZ(y))
= P (X ≤ HZ(y)) = HZ(y).
Hence, the associated cumulative distribution to random variable Y is function HZ .
We transform the distance as follows with function g(x) = b−H−1(x). Solving this
model is the same as solving the previous untransformed model with taste payoff
g(z) = b− z and Z ∼ HZ(z).
Proof of Proposition 7
The proof follows directly from the text.
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